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Raoul Berger stands for the honorable tradition that a scholar
must put aside his own social and economic predilections and look
only to original sources in seeking the meaning of the United
States Constitution. His numerous books and articles have addressed many of the most pressing questions about the organization and prerogatives of the three branches of the federal government, including the President's right to withhold information from
Congress,1 the congressional power of impeachment,2 the reach of
executive war powers,3 the scope of judicial authority under the
5
fourteenth amendment,4 the legitimacy of capital punishment,
and the congressional power to remove controversial matters from
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.6 On some of these
issues (executive privilege, impeachment, war powers, and jurisdic* 0 1987 by Michael W. McConnell.
t Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks are due the Russell
Baker Scholars Fund for providing financial support during the preparation of this review,
and to Albert Alschuler, Mary Becker, David Currie, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Helmholz,
Dennis Hutchinson, Fred McChesny, Geoffrey Miller, Richard Posner, Geoffrey Stone, and
Cass Sunstein for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
[Editors' note: This issue contains two contrasting reviews of Raoul Berger's Federalism: The Founders' Design. Although Professors McConnell and Powell argue on behalf of
significantly different positions, their articles are not in the form of a "debate." Neither
reviewer had an opportunity to see the other's manuscript prior to publication of the issue.]
I Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974).
2 Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (1973).
3 Berger, Executive Privilege at 60-116 (cited in note 1).
4 Raoul Berger, Government By Judiciary- The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1977).
s Raoul Berger, Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course (1982).
Raoul Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court (1969).
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tion stripping) Berger has taken the position usually associated
with political liberals. On some (capital punishment and the fourteenth amendment) he has taken a position more closely associated
with political conservatives-indeed, in the case of the fourteenth
amendment going far beyond them. On some he has taken positions explicitly contrary to his own political preferences. 7
In his new book Federalism:The Founders' Design, Berger for
the first time addresses the Constitution's allocation of power between the federal government and the states. Those who have ears
to hear will find evidence more than sufficient to show that what
the people ratified is something quite different from what they ultimately got. The book is neither analytical nor theoretical; the
reader must bring to the book his own framework for translating
historical detail into a "usable past."8 The strength of the book is
entirely in its details-in the relentless collation of quotations in
the text, with still more piled in the footnotes, demonstrating, in a
variety of contexts, that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution intended the authority of the states to be far greater, and that
of the federal government far less, than it has turned out to be.'
Berger's work casts doubt on (he would say clearly refutes) most of
the major arguments justifying today's centralization of authority
in Washington.
This is not to say, however, that The Founders' Design is a
particularly successful book. Even to one sympathetic, as I am, to
Berger's position, the book seems radically incomplete. While it
provides ample reason to believe our constitutional structure has
gone astray, it gives no reason why we should care and no attention
to the considerations of democratic authority and judicial restraint
that have contributed to the present state of affairs.
I.
The Founders' Design shares the weakness of Berger's earlier
writing, in that it fails to link his discoveries about the issue at
See, e.g., Berger, Government By Judiciary at 4 (cited in note 4). Indeed, Professor

Berger announces that his conclusions in The Founders'Design "not infrequently are at war
with my predilections" (p. 5). All parenthetical page references in text and notes are to
Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design (1987).

8 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1426 n.9
(1987)(emphasis in original).

9 The book could have used more careful editing. Quotations are often repeated twice
and more, for no apparent reason. In the most irritating instance, Berger quotes Chief Jus-

tice Marshall in a footnote, and then uses the same quotation in the succeeding sentence in
text. (pp. 155-56 and n.162).
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hand to any overarching understanding of the purposes and architecture of the Constitution. Instead, it is narrowly and dispiritingly
positivistic. Great constitutional scholarship is, like Berger's, attentive to the details of the document and true to its sources. But it
also does something more (and this something is what makes constitutional law a worthwhile scholarly enterprise): it makes the
Constitution a window through which we learn about humankind
as a political creature. The United States Constitution inspires
reverence not just because it was drafted and ratified by our forefathers, who were an uncommonly clever lot, but because it is the
most successful attempt in history to construct a polity consistent
with both the baser passions and the higher aspirations of its citizens. Studying the Constitution has some of the same intellectual
delight as reading Aristotle: it opens the mind on a subject of the
first importance.
The Founders' Design has little of this quality. We learn from
it that our forefathers had a high regard for the autonomous existence of the states and intended the Constitution to guarantee this
autonomy. We do not learn how this scheme of dual sovereignty
relates to any of the great themes and objectives of American constitutionalism. We are, therefore, shut off from an important
source of wisdom about things political and left indifferent, except
as a technical matter of fealty to positive law, to the identified departures from the founders' design.
The Founders' Design also exhibits a confusion, less evident in
Berger's earlier books, about the theoretical underpinning of his
constitutionalism. This book is not, like Government By Judiciary' ° or Death Penalties: The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course,"
a call for judicial restraint. It gains no support from a theory of
constitutional interpretation based on democratic majoritarianism.
If carried into practice, The Founders' Design would require
wholesale, and not always predictable, judicial intervention into
American governance and a massive repudiation of laws duly
adopted by representative bodies and supported by large majorities of the populace. It therefore presents a break with Berger's
prior posture of virtual legislative supremacy. 2
The usual position of those who rail against "government by
judiciary" is that democratic decision making is the general rule,
10 Berger,

Government by Judiciary (cited in note 4).
11Berger, Death Penalties (cited in note 5).
11See, e.g., Berger, Executive Privilege at 3 (cited in note 1). See also The Founders'
Design (p. 14) (calling the legislative branch the "darling of the Founders").
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with judicial intervention justified only when the Constitution
fairly can be interpreted (in light of its text, structure, history, and
purposes) as foreclosing the course of action adopted by representative institutions. Because decisions holding governmental choices
unconstitutional cannot be reversed, short of constitutional
amendment or change of Court personnel, a court should resolve
doubts against intervention. This is the lesson of Dred Scott,1"
which stripped Congress of its power to bring slavery to heel, and
also of the New Deal, which had to confront judge-made barriers
to national social and economic legislation. Of the two classes of
judicial error-striking down constitutional legislation and upholding unconstitutional legislation-the former is the more dangerous,
since the political corrective is so much more difficult.
In The Founders'Design, however, Berger refuses to recognize
that most of the Supreme Court's retreat from federalism has been
a product of deference to democratic choice and to the tendency to
avoid the more dangerous type of error, even at the cost of the less
dangerous one. Indeed, he fails to acknowledge the seemingly obvious conflict between judicial restraint and the aggressive judicial
enforcement of federalism principles. "It is to be hoped," Berger
comments in the book's concluding chapter, "that the historical
facts may lead the court to curtail its increasingintrusion into the
States' internal affairs" (pp. 187-88) (emphasis added). He qualifies
his hope by adding that "those who enjoy the exercise of uncurbed
power are unlikely to surrender it merely because it has been
usurped" (p. 186). These comments might be closer to the mark if
they dealt with Roe v. Wade,1 4 or with federal court takeover of
state prisons and hospitals, or with judicial supervision of state
codes of criminal procedure. In these contexts the courts might be
said to have "usurped" decisionmaking authority constitutionally
vested in the state governments. But how can Berger say this of
decisions upholding Acts of Congress, duly passed by representatives of the people? Is there no difference between judicial aggrandizement and judicial deference to legislative authority?
Berger needs to develop a new, more comprehensive theory of
constitutional interpretation. His prior anti-judicial, pro-legislative
stance cannot explain his conclusions here. I do not mean to suggest that Berger's position cannot be defended; a convincing case
can be made for a more active judicial role where the courts determine the allocation of decision making authority among represen,S 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tative institutions rather than arrogating final decision making
power to themselves.15 Without such a theory, however, the message of The Founders' Design is less than compelling.
In any event, Berger's contrast between the original constitutional design and the current situation is somewhat overdrawn.
The erosion of local autonomy may well have been inevitable,
given the constitutional structure. Whatever the founders' intentions, the rules they wrote are skewed in favor of national power.
In cases of conflict between state and federal law, federal law
wins.16 If there is disagreement over constitutional rules, a depart17
ment of the federal government, the courts, serves as umpire.
And the principal structural protection for federalism, the direct
representation of state legislatures in the Senate, was eliminated
by the seventeenth amendment.1 8
Technological and social change also play a part. Constitutional limits expressed in terms of interstate consequences lead to
different results when applied to railroads than when applied to a
horse and buggy. As the size of the market has expanded, so has
federal power. Furthermore, for most people most of the time, issues of federalism take second seat to particular substantive outcomes. Even a conservative administration, ostensibly committed
to a restoration of federalism, backed legislation coercing the states
to raise their drinking age, a matter reserved to the states under
the twenty-first amendment. 19 The measure was then upheld in an
opinion by the states' supposed best friend, Chief Justice Rehnquist.20 So it has gone for 200 years. Berger does not comment on
these aspects of the "founders' design." Instead, he places the entire blame on the courts.

"6This approach is diametrically opposed to the one advocated by Professor Herbert
Wechsler and Dean Jesse Choper. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 Colum.L.Rev. 543 (1954); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process (1980).
16 U.S.Const. art. VI, § 2 (supremacy clause).
1" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). But see Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 547-554 (1985) (leaving state constitutional
claims to the mercies of Congress).
" U.S.Const. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years ....
").
19 See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S.Ct. 720, 726-27 (1987); id. at 730-34 (O'Connor
dissenting).
20 South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S.Ct. 2793 (1987).
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II.
The Founders' Design begins (p.21) with the question: which
came first, the nation or the states? After the Revolution and
before ratification of the Constitution, were the states sovereign
governments, or did their authority devolve from the Union? Berger persuasively argues, contrary to the positions of Joseph Story
and of Justice George Sutherland in the Curtiss-Wright case,2 1
that after the Declaration of Independence, each of the colonies
became fully independent states-independent of each other as
well as of the mother country. Indeed, a literal reading of the Articles of Confederation, eventually adopted by all thirteen states,
can hardly yield any other conclusion.
Berger is less persuasive when explaining why this matters.
The important question is not the locus of sovereignty prior to the
Constitution, but under the Constitution. Berger's presentation
implies a continuity in the theory of sovereignty from 1776 to 1787;
but he undertakes no explicit defense of this assumption. He ignores the Constitution's own evidence on the issue: that it conspicuously drops the Articles of Confederation provision stating that
"each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence;" 22
that it boldly states the source of its authority as "We, the People
of the United States; '23 that for ratification it bypassed the state
legislatures and went to the people directly through conventions.
The most persuasive inference from the text of the Constitution is
that sovereignty rests in the people of the United States, and not
in the governments of either the states or the nation. 25 It follows
that the extent of federal authority is neither more nor less than
that delegated through the Constitution. That the states were in
some sense sovereign prior to the Constitution seems largely
irrelevant.
The initial discussion of sovereignty reveals a tendency,
2'

Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 207-217

at 142-54 (2d ed. 1851); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-19
(1936).
2 U.S. Articles of Confederation art. II.
23 U.S.Const. preamble. Note that the term "United States," even under the Articles,
referred to the confederacy rather than to the several states, and that every reference to the
United States in the Constitution is to the federal government. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend.
X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution. . . are reserved to
the States respectively . .
").
21 U.S. Const. art. VII. See Federalist 22 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 152 (1961).
25 For a more extended discussion, see Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1429-39 (cited in note 8).
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present throughout The Founders' Design, to emphasize what the
founders said about the Constitution rather than the words of the
Constitution itself. While the founders' explanations of their purposes are obviously useful in helping us to understand the words of
the Constitution, Berger teeters on the brink of saying that the
meaning of the Constitution is subordinate to the founders' intentions. At one point he states, quoting from Hawaii v. Mankichi,2 6
"'The intention of the lawmaker is the law,' rising even above the
text" (pp. 15-16). Elsewhere, he states that "judges are confined to
the four corners of the Constitution as explained by the Founders"
(p. 10)-a position that (assuming "the four corners of the Constitution" to include arguments based on structure, history, and purposes as well as bare text) rests more comfortably within the traditional understanding of constitutionalism. These two
statements-that intentions rise above the text and that judging is
confined to the four corners of the document-are irreconcilable
and suggest that Berger is in something of an interpretive muddle.
This muddle manifests itself in two ways throughout The
Founders' Design. First, it leads him to underplay arguments from
the text of the Constitution. Berger is far too quick to give up on
the words of the Constitution; indeed, I cannot recall a single argument in the book that depends, in a serious way, on textual
analysis.
Second, it leads him to confuse the founders' expectations
about how the nation would be governed under the Constitution
with the founders' understanding of the meaning of the Constitution. This problem pervades the book. The succeeding chapters, on
the tenth amendment, the general welfare clause, the commerce
clause, the fourteenth amendment, and the specific issue of mass
transit, each contrasts the founders' expectations about the polity
they were constructing with the way things have turned out. But
this is not necessarily the same question as whether modern developments have violated the Constitution.
For example, did the founders expect agriculture to become an
important element in national commercial life? I agree with Berger
(pp. 73-75) that they did not. Hamilton, no advocate of "states'
rights," wrote that "the supervision of agriculture and of other
concerns of a similar nature . . . which are proper to be provided
for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general
jurisdiction" (p.74).27 Does it follow that the Congress of 150 years
28 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903).
17

Federalist 17 (Hamilton), in The Federalist Papers at 118 (cited in note 24).
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later acted illegitimately when it concluded that regulation of agriculture was a "necessary and proper" means for curing national
economic depression? The framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
established rules and standards for determining the scope of national authority; that those rules and standards produce different
outcomes in later circumstances is neither surprising nor troubling.
The legal question must be whether congressional agricultural regulation is sufficiently related to "Commerce. . .among the several
States." On that issue, the founders' expectations about agriculture
are interesting and important, but cannot take precedence over the
constitutional standard.
III.
The biggest disappointment in The Founders'Design is that it
ignores the intellectual case for federalism. That the states should
retain substantial independent authority is not self-evident. As
Madison pointedly inquired in Federalist 45:
[I]f. . .the Union be essential to the happiness of the people
of America, is it not preposterous to urge as an objection...
that such a government may derogate from the importance of
the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the
American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy
formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the
hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but
that the government of the individual States, that particular
municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of
power and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
sovereignty?2 8
Madison's question was directed to "adversaries to the plan of the
convention. ' ' 29 It might as aptly be directed to the adversaries of
our present centralized government: why forego national measures,
thought to promote the peace, liberty, and safety of the people,
merely because they intrude upon the "certain extent of power"
traditionally reserved to the governments of the individual States?
Why do we care about federalism?
The Founders' Design ought to be the place to find answers.
After all, the defenders of decentralized government in 1787-89 deFederalist 45 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 288-89 (cited in note 24).
29Id. at 288.
28
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feated the more expansive proposals of the nationalists, eventually
converting even Madison himself to their cause. Much of this was
accomplished through force of argument. Even as they failed to
block the "plan of the convention," they forced important compromises, including addition of the Bill of Rights, and in the process became full co-founders of our innovative federal system. One
of the most important developments of modern intellectual history
has been the rediscovery of "federalist" and "anti-federalist" political thought.3 0 This development has coincided with the "public
choice" movement in economics and political science, which lays
the theoretical groundwork for an appreciative appraisal of the
founders' thought. 31 We are, therefore, better prepared than ever
before to deal with Madison's question.
Surprisingly, however, The Founders' Design gives little or no
attention to reasons offered by the decentralizers, and accepted by
the nation, for preserving a large measure of local autonomy. As a
consequence, Berger is unable to subject their ideas to critical
analysis. While asserting that the attachment to local governance
"had a rational basis" (p. 55), Berger gives little clue as to what it
was. It seems almost enough that the people of 1787 had a "natural
attachment, 3 2 in Madison's words, to their states (p.56).
The founders' design is much richer than Berger's book
reveals. During the debates over the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution, supporters and opponents alike came to articulate
complex and sophisticated theories of federalism (which, it should
be stressed, was a uniquely American blend of national systems-like the French-and confederate systems-like the ancient
Greek and early modern Dutch).33 The "natural attachment" of
the people in 1787 to their states was augmented by practical arguments about how the new system of dual sovereignty would promote three complementary objectives: (1) "[t]o secure the public
good," (2) to protect "private rights," and (3) "to preserve the
spirit and form of popular government." Achievement of these
o To my mind, the most interesting and important work is Herbert J. Storing, ed., The
Complete Anti-Federalist (1981), including Storing's introductory essay, "What the Anti.
Federalists Were For."
1, See Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic (2d ed. 1987);
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).
32 Federalist 46 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 294 (cited in note 24).
11 See Federalist 18-20 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 122-38 (cited in note 24);
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 156 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969); Martin Diamond,
What the Framers Meant By Federalism, in Ronald A. Goldwin, ed., A Nation of States 24
(1963).
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ends, according to Madison, was the "great object" of the Constitution.34 To understand the "founders' design" we must look again
at those arguments. As the people of 1987, we must look at them in
light of modern experience and knowledge about political decision
making. The arguments of 1787 stand up remarkably well.
A. To "Secure the Public Good"
Rejecting both pure confederation and consolidation, the
"Federal Farmer" (the ablest and most influential of the anti-federalist pamphleteers) argued that a "partial consolidation" is the
only system "that can secure the freedom and happiness of this
people." He reasoned that "one government and general legislation
alone, never can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United
States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different
states, which by a uniform system of laws would be unreasonably
invaded. 3 5 The framers sought, the Federal Farmer concluded, to
preserve decentralized decision making because smaller units of
government are better able to further the interests and general
welfare of the people.
Three important advantages of decentralized decision making
emerge from an examination of the founders' arguments and the
modern literature. First, decentralized decision making is better
able to reflect the diversity of interests and preferences of individuals in different parts of the nation. Second, allocation of decision
making authority to a level of government no larger than necessary
will prevent mutually disadvantageous attempts by communities to
take advantage of their neighbors. And third, decentralization allows for innovation and competition in government.
1. Responsiveness to diverse interests and preferences. The
first, and most axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government
is that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local
tastes, while a national government must take a uniform-and
hence less desirable-approach. So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decision making
than by a single national authority. This was well understood by
the founding generation. A noted pamphleteer, "The Impartial Examiner," put the point this way: "For being different societies,
though blended together in legislation, and having as different in" Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 80 (cited in note 24).
35 Storing, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 2.8.13-14 (cited in note 30).
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terests; no uniform rule for the whole seems to be practicable."' 6I
For example, assume that there are only two states, with equal
populations of 100 each. Assume further that 70 percent of State
A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a
national basis by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and
90 displeased. If a separate decision is made by majorities in each
state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in State A decide to
move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move
to State A.3 7 In the absence of economies of scale in government
services,38 significant externalities, 9 or compelling arguments from
justice, 40 this is a powerful reason to prefer decentralized government. States are preferable governing units to the federal government, and local government to states. Modern public choice theory
provides strong support for the framers' insight on this point.4 '
2. Destructive competition for the benefits of government. A
second consideration in designing a federal structure is more
equivocal. The unit of decision making must be large enough so
that decisions reflect the full costs and benefits, but small enough
that destructive competition for the benefits of central government

" Storing, 5 Complete Anti-Federalist at 5.14.6 (cited in note 30). See also Tocqueville,
Democracy in America at 161 (cited in note 33) ("In large centralized nations the lawgiver is
bound to give the laws a uniform character which does not fit the diversity of places and of
mores.").
Under certain extreme assumptions, a sufficiently decentralized regime with full mobility could perfectly satisfy each person's preferences even with no voting at all. See Dennis
C. Mueller, Public Choice 126-29 (1979); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.Pol.Econ. 416 (1956). This point is also pertinent to the "liberty" argument
for federalism. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
38 Economies of scale are probably not a major consideration. Small units of government are able to contract with one another or with private service providers so as to achieve
economies of scale without sacrificing decision making autonomy. Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 Pub.Choice 19, 21 (Spring 1969). For a contrasting view, see Jerome Rothenberg, Local Decentralization and the Theory of Optimal Government, in Julius
Margolis, ed., The Analysis of Public Output 31, 33 (1970).
39 See notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
40 See notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
41 See Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 11-13, 54-63 (1972); Tullock, 6 Pub.Choice
at 19 (cited in note 38); J. Roland Pennock, Federal and Unitary Government-Disharmony
and Frustration, 4 Behavioral Science 147 (Apr. 1959). The model in the text is oversimplified. As Susan Rose-Ackerman has shown, under a decentralized regime citizens of a given
state might support a policy at the state level while opposing the same policy on a uniform
basis at the national level. Her example is legalized gambling: citizens of a state with legalized gambling have more to gain if most other states do not have it. Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Does Federalism Matter?, 89 J.Pol.Econ. 152, 154-57 (1981). This qualification does not affect my argument.
37
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action is minimized.
In economic language, this is the problem of
"externalities. ' '42
Externalities present the principal countervailing consideration in favor of centralized government: if the costs of government
action are borne by the citizens of State C, but the benefits are
shared by the citizens of States D, E, and F, State C will be unwilling to expend the level of resources commensurate with the full
social benefit of the action.43 This was the argument in Federalist
25 for national control of defense. 44 Since an MX missile in Pennsylvania will deter a Soviet attack on Connecticut and North Carolina as well as Pennsylvania, optimal levels of investment in MX's
require national decisions and national taxes. Or, similarly, since
expenditures on water pollution reduction in Kentucky will benefit
riparians all the way to New Orleans, it makes sense to nationalize
decisions about water pollution regulation and treatment. Thus, as
James Wilson explained to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
"[w]hatever the object of government extends, in its operation, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of the United States" (quoted at pp.
169-70) (emphasis in original).
That significant external effects of this sort provide justification for national decisions is well understood-hence federal funding of defense, interstate highways, national parks, and medical research, and federal regulation of interstate commerce, pollution,
and national labor markets. It is less well understood that nationalizing decisions where the impact is predominantly local has an
equal and opposite effect. The framers' awareness that ill consequences flow as much from excessive as from insufficient centralization is fundamental to their insistence on enumerating and thus
limiting the powers of the federal government. Hence the other
half of Wilson's explanation: "Whatever object of government is
confined in its operation and effect, within the bounds of a particular State, should be considered as belonging to the government of
that State" (p. 169) (emphasis in original).4 ' This stands in marked

"ISee generally Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 Pub.Choice at 19 (cited in
note 38); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 600 (3d ed. 1986).
13 See Mancur Olson, Jr., The Principle of "Fiscal Equivalence:" The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government, 59 Am.Econ.Rev. 479, 482 (1969).
" Federalist 25 (Hamilton), in The Federalist Papers at 163 (cited in note 24). For a
modern version of the argument, see Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 Rev.Econ. & Stat. 266, 278 (1966).
4B Wilson's formulation was widely echoed in the debates of the period. See, e.g., Storing, 3 Complete Anti-Federalist at 3.14.8 (cited in note 30) (essays of "A [Pennsylvania]
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contrast to the modern tendency to resolve all doubts in favor of
federal control.
The point is quite general. It applies to lawmaking and regulation no less than to taxing and spending. 46 A major effect of regulation is to shift burdens from one region or locality to another. Familiar examples are environmental laws that protect eastern
"dirty" coal from competition from western "clean" coal4 and railroad regulation that enables low density areas to maintain service
at the expense of other traffic. 48 But the effect is especially obvious
in the case of federal spending. If the national treasury is seen as a
common pool resource for financing schemes of predominantly loare
cal benefit, it will be oversubscribed. Current budgetary woes
'49
commons.
the
of
"tragedy
fiscal
this
to
largely attributable
Where the benefits of government action are predominantly
local but financing is national, each community can be expected to
pursue projects even where total cost exceeds the actual benefit.
Local decisionmakers will take into account only the local portion
of the cost, since the national portion will be effectively "free."
Nobel laureate James Buchanan has demonstrated mathematically that centralized decision making about projects of localized
impact will result in excessive spending-excessive meaning more
than any of the individual communities involved would freely
choose.50 Each community would be better off if they could agree
in advance (as they thought they did in the Constitution) to confine federal attention to issues of predominantly interstate
consequence.
In this connection, Berger's chapter on the spending power is
especially weak. Article I, § 8, clause 1 of the Constitution grants
Congress the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense
Farmer"). According to Tocqueville, a similar model was employed for the allocation of
power between states and townships. See Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 67 (cited in
note 33)("In all that concerns themselves alone the townships remain independent bodies,

and I do not think one could find a single inhabitant of New England who would recognize
the right of the government of the state to control matters of purely municipal interest.").
'"See Storing, 5 Complete Anti-Federalist at 5.14.6 (cited in note 30)(the "Impartial
Examiner" arguing that a single national mode of taxation will result in each state endeavoring "to raise a revenue by such means, as may appear least injurious to its own interest").
47Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981).
48 See Southern Railway v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93 (1964).
49 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
" Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus of Consent at 135-40 (cited in note 31). See also
Olson, "Fiscal Equivalence" at 482-83 (cited in 43); Gordon Tullock, Comment, in Julius
Margolis, ed., The Analysis of Public Output 65 (1970).
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and general Welfare of the United States." Berger goes to some
lengths to support Madison's argument that this is not "an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to
be necessary for the common defense or general welfare" (p.102)."
This is uncontroversial: in modern constitutional litigation no one
cites the general welfare clause in support of federal power other
than taxing or spending.5 2 The controverted issue is whether the
clause places any limit on the objects for which Congress may tax
and spend.
On this point, Berger defends Madison's argument that spending for the "general welfare" is confined to spending for purposes
elsewhere enumerated in the Constitution (p. 104). I am inclined,
like Alexander Hamilton, Joseph Story, and the Supreme Court, to
reject this argument on textual grounds. 3 "General Welfare" is a
broader term than "purposes hereinafter enumerated," and
Madison's interpretation makes the general welfare clause redundant. Yet Madison's argument is perfectly respectable, if only because Madison made it. However, Berger's presentation of the argument, especially his attempted refutation of Hamilton, is
unsound. Essentially, Berger argues that because Hamilton unsuccessfully argued in favor of "the unlimited power of passing all
laws without exception, ' 54 an unlimited power to spend money for
the general welfare must have been equally "unacceptable to the
Convention" (p. 108). This is to say that rejection of a broader
power implies rejection of a narrower.
In his rush to discredit Hamilton's position, Berger fails to
note that Hamilton himself articulated a limitation on the spending power more theoretically satisfactory and more textually supportable than Madison's. "[T]he object to which an appropriation
of money is . . .made [must] be General and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the Union, and
not being confined to a particular spot." 55 This construction is a

" Federalist 41 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 262 (cited in note 24).
52 See Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 907 at 630
(cited in note 21); Edward Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act, 36
Harv.L.Rev. 548, 551 (1923).
" United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-66 (1936); Alexander Hamilton, Report on
Manufactures, in Harold L. Syrett, ed., 10 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 302-04 (1966);
Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 14 at 629 (cited in note 21). But see David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev.
504, 534-36 (1987).
" Max Farrand, ed., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 300 (1937)(emphasis in original).
5' 10 Papers of Hamilton at 303 (cited in note 53)(emphasis in original).
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persuasive reading of the term "general welfare" (the word "general" is frequently used in the debates to signify "national"5 6 ), and
it guards against precisely the fiscal tragedy of the commons discussed above. Moreover-though Berger fails to mention it-early
debates in Congress on a proposal to provide $15,000 for the relief
of survivors of a fire in Savannah, Georgia support Hamilton's view
that the line was drawn between objects of a predominantly local,
as opposed to a general or national, impact.5"
3. Innovation and competition in government. A final reason
why federalism has been thought to advance the public good is
that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer useful changes. A consolidated national government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles
choice and lacks the goad of competition.
Lower levels of government are more likely to depart from established consensus simply because they are smaller and more numerous. Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number
of independent observations will produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If innovation is desirable, it follows that decentralization is desirable. This statistical proposition is strengthened, moreover, by the political reality that a smaller unit of
government is more likely to have a population with preferences
that depart from the majority's. It is, therefore, more likely to try
an approach that could not command a national majority.58
Perhaps more important is that smaller units of government
have an incentive, beyond the mere political process, to adopt popular policies. If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each
citizen's share of the overhead costs of government is proportionately reduced. Since people are better able to move among states
or communities than to emigrate from the United States, competition among governments for taxpayers will be far stronger at the
state and local than at the federal level. Since most people are tax-

16 See, e.g., Storing, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 2.8.78 (cited in note 30)(letters from
the "Federal Farmer")("In a federal system we must not only balance the parts of the same
government, as that of the state, or that of the union; but we must find a balancing influence between the general and local governments.").
57 6 Annals of Cong. 1712-27 (Dec. 28, 1796).
18 Susan Rose-Ackerman has contended that local politicians in a decentralized system
will be more risk averse than politicians in a consolidated national government. Susan RoseAckerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J.Legal
Stud. 593 (1980). The point here, however, is that there will be more innovation in a decentralized system as a whole, both because there are more actors and because individual constituencies will perceive risk and reward differently. This will hold true even if the average
local politician is more risk averse than the average federal politician.
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payers, this means that there is a powerful incentive for decentralized governments to make things better for most people.59 In particular, the desire to attract taxpayers and jobs will promote
policies of economic growth and expansion.
It is well known, for example, that families often choose a
community on the basis of the school system; a better school system encourages development and raises property values. Competition among communities is therefore likely to result in superior education (as well as more cost-effective ways of providing it). This is
especially likely given the strong business support for education.
Because of the need for a well-educated work force, businesses
often choose to locate in communities with a superior educational
system and push for improved education in communities where
they already have facilities." The chairman of Xerox Corporation
has been quoted as saying, "Education is a bigger factor in productivity growth [rates] than increased capital, economies of scale or
' 61
better allocation of resources.
To be sure, the results of competition among states and localities will not always be salutary. State-by-state determination of
the laws of incorporation likely results in the most efficient forms
of corporate organization 6 2 but state-by-state determination of the
law of products liability seems to have created a liability monster.
This is because each state can benefit in-state plaintiffs by more
generous liability rules, the costs being exported to largely out-ofstate defendants; while no state can do much to protect its in-state
manufacturers from suits by plaintiffs in the other states. Thus,
competition among the states in this arena leads to one-sidedly
pro-plaintiff rules of law. 3
The most important example of this phenomenon is the effect
of state-by-state competition on welfare and other redistributive
policies. In most cases, immigration of investment and of middleto-upper income persons is perceived as desirable, while immigra-

" See Tiebout,

64 J.Pol.Econ. 416 (cited in note 37).

'0 See Janice C. Simpson, A Shallow Labor Pool Spurs Businesses to Act to Bolster

Education, Wall St.J. at 1, col. 1 (Sept. 28, 1987).
Id.
61 See Judge Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Sys61

tems, 6 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Pol. 127 (1982).
'3 See Michael W. McConnell, A Choice of Law Approach to Products Liability Reform, in Walter Olson, ed., New Directions in Liability Law (1988)(forthcoming). This conclusion hinges on several unstated assumptions, the most important of which is that manufacturers cannot (either because of legal restrictions or the possibility of arbitrage) set
different prices in different states in response to product liability rules. See David A. Rice,
Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U.L.Rev. 1, 5-8 (1985).
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tion of persons dependent on public assistance is viewed as a drain
on a community's finances. Yet generous welfare benefits paid by
higher taxes will lead the rich to leave and the poor to come. This
creates an incentive, other things being equal, against redistributive policies.6 4 Indeed, it can be shown that the level of redistribution in a decentralized system is likely to be lower even if there is
virtually unanimous agreement among the citizens that higher
levels would be desirable.6 5 Where redistribution is the objective,
therefore, advocates should and do press for federal programs, or
at least for minimum federal standards.66
Thus, the competition among states has an uncertain effect:
often salutary but sometimes destructive. There are races to the
bottom as well as races to the top. Often one's view of the allocation of authority for specific issues will depend on a prediction as
to substantive outcomes rather than a general theory of federalism.
B.

To protect "private rights"

The most important reason offered by the defenders of state
sovereignty was that state and local governments are better protectors of liberty. Patrick Henry went to the heart of the matter when
he told the Virginia ratifying convention:
You are not to inquire how your trade may be increased, nor
how you are to become a great and powerful people, but how
your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the direct
end of your Government.6
The most eloquent of the opponents of the Constitution, Henry
stated flatly that in the "alarming transition, from a Confederacy
to a consolidated Government," the "rights and privileges" of
Americans were "endangered." 8 He was far from alone in this
4 To the extent that the poor migrate in response to job opportunities rather than
welfare benefits, this effect is reduced.
6 Oates, Fiscal Federalism at 6-8 (cited in note 41); see also Paul E. Peterson, City
Limits (1981); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 599, 611-12 (cited in note 42). This is
an instance of the free rider problem: even if every member of the community would be
willing to vote for higher welfare benefits, it would be in the interest of each to leave the
burden of paying for the program to others.
'6 This is not necessarily to say that welfare should be federalized. Against the point
made in the text must be balanced the greater flexibility and humanity of programs conducted at the community level, especially through voluntary associations. An impersonal,
bureaucratic welfare system poses grave risks to the character of both recipients and providers. I do not begin to have an answer to the problem.
67 Storing, 5 Complete Anti-Federalist at 5.16.2 (cited in note 30).

68 Id.
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At a distance of 200 years, it is this aspect of the founders'
thought that is most difficult for us to understand.7 0 After Brown
v. Board of Education7 ' and the various civil rights acts, after the
revolution in criminal procedure fostered by federal law and federal courts, after the imposition of uniform federal standards for
basic liberties under the Bill of Rights, and after the proliferation
of novel statutory "rights" arising from the interventions of the
welfare-regulatory state, it is the federal government, not the
states, that appears to be our system's primary protector of individual liberties. This seems to be the premise of the Fourteenth
Amendment and of much of New Deal legislation.72 The view at
the founding, however, was much more divided and ambivalent.
Madison's most important contribution to the debate over ratification is his challenging argument that individual liberties, such
as property rights and freedom of religion, are better protected at
the national than the state level. The argument, presented principally in Federalist10,13 is familiar to all, but is no less controversial for being familiar. It is one of the glaring lacunae in The Founders' Design that Berger fails to explore the implications of this
argument. It is especially odd, given Berger's autobiographical observation that he had long associated "States' Rights" with
"Southern condonation of lynchings, with official oppression of
blacks, and with demagogues who duped their constituents" (p. 5).
It was these nefarious features of state government that Madison
intended to counteract through the Union.
Madison's argument, greatly simplified, is that the most serious threat to individual liberty is the tyranny of a majority faction.
Since any given faction is more likely to be concentrated in a particular locality, and to be no more than a small minority in the
" See, e.g., 1 Federal Convention at 340-41 (Luther Martin) (cited in note 54); Storing,
2 Complete Anti-federalist at 2.3.7 (Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr.) (cited in note 30);
id. at 2.9.22 (Brutus). Compare Tocqueville's analysis: "Local institutions are to liberty what
primary schools are to science; they put it within the people's reach; they teach people to
appreciate its peaceful enjoyment and accustom them to make use of it. Without local insti-

tutions a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not got the spirit of liberty."
Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 63 (cited in note 33).
70 For a more detailed discussion, see Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19
Georgia L.Rev. 917 (1985).
71

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

7' See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv.L.Rev.

-,

(1987)(forthcoming).
73 Madison put the argument forward earlier in an essay entitled "Notes on the Confederacy," written in April, 1787. See 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 32528 (1865).
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nation as a whole, it follows that factional tyranny is more likely in
the state legislatures than in the Congress of the United States.
This argument is supplemented by others, based on the "proper
structure of the Union" 74-deliberative

representation, separation

of powers, and checks and balances-that also suggest that the
federal government is a superior protector of rights. Here I shall
concentrate on the argument from the "extent . . . of the
Union. '75 Madison's argument blunted the anti-federalists' appeal

to state sovereignty as the guarantor of liberty. It was, however,
only partially successful. Why?
Modern public choice theory has cast some doubt on elements
of Madison's theory. In particular, Madison's assumption that the
possibility of minority tyranny is neutralized by majority vote requirements and that minority factions are inherently vulnerable to
majority tyranny 76 is undermined by studies showing that a small,
cohesive faction intensely interested in a particular outcome can
exercise disproportionate influence in the political arena.77
Madison underestimated both the dangers of minority rule and the
defensive resources of minority groups. Moreover, some observers
have suggested that the conditions of modern federal politics-especially the balkanized, issue-oriented conjunction of bureaucratic agencies and committee staffs-is especially susceptible
to factional politics. Professor Richard Stewart has dubbed the result "Madison's Nightmare."7 8 Proponents of greater state sovereignty in 1787-89 may have been rightly skeptical of Madison's
claims that there would be less danger of factional oppression at
the federal level.
But even taking Madison's fundamental insight as correct-and surely it has much to commend it-the argument on its
own terms cautions against total centralization of authority in
Washington. It points instead to a hybrid system in which states
7' Federalist 10
7& Id.

(Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 84 (cited in note 24).

76 Id. at 80:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog

the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and
mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a
faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.
7 See generally Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (1965); James Q.
Wilson, Political Organizations (1973); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98
Harv.L.Rev. 713 (1985).
78 Stewart, 19 Georgia L.Rev. at 921 (cited in note 70).
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retain a major role in the protection of individual liberties. There
are three basic reasons.
1. Liberty through mobility. Madison's argument demon-

strates that factional oppression is more likely to occur in the
smaller, more homogenous jurisdictions of individual states. But it
does not deny that oppression at the federal level, when it occurs,
is more dangerous. The lesser likelihood must be balanced against
the greater magnitude of the danger. The main reason oppression
at the federal level is more dangerous is that it is more difficult to
escape. If a single state chose, for example, to prohibit divorce,
couples seeking a divorce could move (or perhaps merely travel) to
other states where their desires can be fulfilled. Oppressive
measures at the state level are easier to avoid. Important recent
examples of this phenomenon are the migration of homosexuals to
cities like San Francisco, where they received official toleration,
and the migration of individuals from Massachusetts to New
Hampshire to escape high rates of taxation. A more contentious
example is the regulation of abortion. If the power to regulate
abortion is returned to the states, there is little likelihood of effective enforcement of anti-abortion laws, since permissive jurisdictions would attract business from more restrictive states. On the
other hand, a nationwide rule-either voted by Congress or
adopted by the courts as a construction of the due process
clause-would have far more dramatic consequences.
Recognition of this feature of decentralized decision making
does not depend on any particular understanding of the substantive content of "liberty." For these purposes, liberty need not be
equated with government inaction. "States' rights" does not imply
minimalist government. Under a regime of decentralized decision
making, it is more, not less, likely that communities will adopt a
radical, controversial form of social organization. Santa Monica,
California, for example, can adopt a form of socialism that is unlikely to command majority support in any state or the nation at
large. To some, Santa Monica will be a beacon of (a particular
form of) liberty; to others, it is a petty tyranny.79 Indianapolis can
(or could, if the courts would allow it)8° adopt anti-pornography
legislation more stringent than national norms. To some (a curious
alliance of feminists and social conservatives) this protects their
The Santa Monica example is borrowed from Charles Fried, Federalism-Why
Should We Care?, 6 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Pol. 1, 2 (1982).
80 American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd 106
S.Ct. 1172 (1986).
7'
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freedom from a pornography-ridden society; to others, this is a violation of freedom of expression. The liberty that is protected by
federalism is not the liberty of the apodictic solution, but the liberty that comes from diversity coupled with mobility.
2. Self-interested government. Madison held that there are
two different and distinct dangers inherent in republican government: the "oppression of [the] . . . rulers" and the "injustice" of
"one part of the society against . . . the other part.""' The first
concern is that government officials will rule in their own interest
instead of the interest of the people. The second is that some persons, organized in factions, will use the governmental powers to oppress others. Significantly, while Madison argued that the danger
of faction is best met at the federal level (for the reasons summarized above), he conceded that the danger of self-interested representation is best tackled at the state level. "As in too small a
sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed ag[ainst]
the weaker party; so in too extensive a one, a defensive concert
may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted with the administration."8 2 Consequently, while powers
most likely to be abused for factional advantage ought to be vested
in the federal government, powers that are most likely to be
abused by self-aggrandizing officials should be left in the states,
where direct popular control is stronger.
3. Diffusion of power. Madison himself did not view his argument as establishing the superiority of a consolidated national government; rather, he presented his famous argument about the tyranny of factions in favor of the intermediate, federalist solution of
dual sovereignty. In Federalist 51, he underscored that "the rights
of the people" are best protected in a system in which "two distinct governments," federal and state, "will control each other."' 3
The diffusion of power, in and of itself, is protective of liberty. In
Tocqueville's evocative words, "Municipal bodies and county administrations are like so many hidden reefs retarding or dividing
81 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers 323 (cited in note 24); see also 1
Letters of James Madison at 325-28 (cited in note 75).
82 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787, in 10 The Papers of James
Madison 214 (Robert A Rutland, ed., 1977). For more extended analysis of this point, see
Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, Calif.L.Rev. (1988) (forthcoming); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup.Ct.Rev. 341, 389.
83 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 323 (cited in note 24).
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the flood of the popular will." '
That the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were not
wholly persuaded that individual liberties are safer in the hands of
the central government is evident from their provision of explicit
protections for certain cherished liberties in the Bill of Rights. An
instructive example is the freedom of religion. 5 If Madison's theory of factions is correct, it suggests that governmental authority
over religion is more safely lodged in the federal government,
where the multiplicity of religious sects will guarantee against oppression, than in the states, where a single religious denomination
often enjoys majority support. Indeed, Madison used the example
of religious sects to demonstrate his point in Federalist 10 and
51.86
The actual treatment of religious freedom in the Constitution
is, however, diametrically opposed to the Madisonian model. State
authority over religion was left intact. Madison proposed an
amendment that "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, 87 even stating that this (along with speech, press, and
jury trial rights against the states) was "the most valuable" of his
proposed amendments to the Constitution.8 Notwithstanding his
plea, the proposal was rejected by the Senate.8 9 By contrast, the
federal government was forbidden to pass any law "respecting an
establishment of religion"-that is, either establishing or disestablishing a religion-or prohibiting the "free exercise thereof."9 0 This
was the "states' rights" approach to the religion question; it left
decisions "respecting" the establishment of religion wholly to the
states."e
0' Tocqueville, Democracy in America at 263 (cited in note 33). Compare Rapaczynski,
1985 Sup.Ct.Rev. at 389 (cited in note 82); Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1492-1519 (cited in note 8).
35 Though the debates over the religion clauses of the first amendment provide valuable
insight into the framers' understanding of the connection between federalism and liberty,
The Founders' Design makes no mention of them.
8' Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 84 (cited in note 24); Federalist
51 (Madison), in id. at 324.
87 1 Annals of Cong. 452 (June 8, 1789) (J. Gales, ed. 1834). Two printings exist of the
first two volumes of the Annals of Congress. They contain different pagination, running
heads, and back titles. The printing with the running head "History of Congress" conforms
to the remaining volumes of the series while the printing with the running head "Gales &
Seaton's history of debates in Congress" is unique. See Checklist of United States Public
Documents 1789-1909, 1463 (3d ed. 1911). All page citations herein are to the latter
printing.

88 Id. at 458.

89 1 Annals of Cong. 86 (Sept. 21, 1789).
90 U.S. Const. amend. I.
9' See Wilbur G. Katz, Religion and American Constitutions 8-11 (1964); William W.
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This decision was understandable. While it was more likely
that individual states would erect a religious establishment (indeed, at that time, five of the thirteen states had an establishment
of some sort), a national establishment would have been far more
threatening to religious liberty. Religious dissenters were free to
travel to more tolerant states, and did; moreover, the example of
the more tolerant states generated pressure on the more restrictive
states to modify their policies. By 1834, the last state establishment was repealed. A national establishment would have been far
more difficult to eradicate. Moreover, religious minorities are more
likely to have influence in an individual state where they are concentrated, and thus more likely to have their rights respected, than
at the national level. As "Philadelphiensis" said of those Quakers
who feared the loss of their religious exemption from compulsory
military service if control over the military were vested in Congress
instead of the state legislature: "Their influence in the state of
Pennsylvania is fully sufficient to save them from suffering very
materially on this account; but in the great vortex of the whole
continent it can have no weight." 2
The religious freedom example illustrates that, right or wrong,
the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights believed that
state governments were, in some vital respects, safer repositories of
power over individual liberties than the federal government. It is
thus no accident that the "police power"-the protection of public
health, safety, and morals-was left to the states, with the federal
government entrusted with less sensitive powers like those over interstate and foreign commerce. As Berger comments, "Moral issues
...are best left to the States, precisely as the Founders intended"
(p.146). Given the diversity of views about issues of morality, and
the potential for oppression, it is natural that lovers of liberty
would be inclined toward decentralized decision making.
At this point, an important qualification is in order. The arguments from the "public good" and from "private rights" make
sense only if one presupposes that the decision in question is appropriate to democratic decision making at some level, be it state
or federal. Some issues are so fundamental to basic justice that
they must be taken out of majoritarian control altogether. This is
why both state and federal governments are prohibited, for example, from passing ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.9 3 These
Van Alstyne, What Is "An Establishment of Religion?," 65 N.C.L.Rev. 909 (1987).
92

Storing, 3 Complete Anti-Federalist at 3.9.12 (cited in note 30).

"I U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl.3; id., § 10, cl.1.
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issues are thus subject to a single national rule; the reason, however, has nothing to do with federalism. Federalism is a system for
allocation of democratic decision making power. For those few but
important matters on which democracy itself cannot be trusted,
neither the "public good" nor the "private rights" argument for
state autonomy can hold sway.
Obviously, different people will assign wider or narrower latitude to majoritarian institutions. The alternative to democracy in
our system is not utopia but judicial rule, which is not immune to
abuse and which unavoidably conflicts with the ideals of republicanism, discussed below. The conclusion that states should retain a
high degree of decision making autonomy is stronger on the humble assumption that most governmental decisions are fairly debatable-that is, that there is no single compelling just answer to many
questions of government.
Even as to compelling matters of justice, however, federalism
remains important as a tactical consideration, at least until a just
national consensus emerges. Prior to a national majority against
slavery, abolitionists would prefer state-by-state decision making,
since there would be at least some free states. Upon emergence of
an anti-slavery national majority, abolitionists would prefer national legislative power. Once a substantial national consensus developed-manifested in two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and
three-quarters of the states-it became time to take the issue out
of democratic politics. But these judgments would not be principled decisions about federalism; they would be tactical judgments
about abolitionism. (On this analysis, the Constitution's allocation
of power with respect to slavery was precisely what tacticallyminded abolitionists should have wanted given the political circumstances. 4 I therefore believe critics of the framers' work as
supportive of slavery are mistaken.95 )
C. To Preserve "the Spirit and Form of Popular Government"
It was an article of faith among advocates of state autonomy
that republicanism could survive only in a small jurisdiction. As
stated by the prominent anti-federalist essayist, "Brutus," "a free
republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent,
" The Dred Scott decision, employing the pernicious doctrine of substantive due process to vitiate Congress's power to deal with the slavery question, upset the constitutional
scheme and thus made civil war unavoidable.
"I See Remarks of Thurgood Marshall at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco
Patent and Trademark Law Association (Maui, Hawaii, May 6, 1987).
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containing such a number of inhabitants, and these increasing in
such rapid progression as that of the whole United States."9 6 They
believed consolidated national government would lead to aristocratic or despotic rule. Their reasons may be reduced to three major themes: (1) enforcement of laws, (2) nature of representation,
and (3) cultivation of public spiritedness.
1. Enforcement of laws. Obedience to the law can arise from
two different sources: fear of punishment and voluntary compliance. A republican government, which has a minimal coercive apparatus, must rely predominantly upon the latter. As Brutus explained, in a free republic "the government must rest for its
support upon the confidence and respect which the people have for
their government and laws."' 97 To the advocates of decentralized
government, this necessarily implied that the units of government
must be small and close to the people. "The confidence which the
people have in their rulers, in a free republic," according to Brutus,
"arises from their knowing them, from their being responsible to
them for their conduct, and from the power they have of displacing
them when they misbehave."9 8 Unfortunately, this confidence is
impossible in a country the size of the United States.
The different parts of so extensive a country could not possibly be made acquainted with the conduct of their representatives, nor be informed of the reasons upon which measures
were founded. The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views,
be jealous of every measure they adopt, and will not support
the laws they pass.9
This proposition finds support in the folklore of the small
town, which in contrast to the big city is an oasis of law abidingness and community good feeling. It also seems consistent with
public choice theory, since in a smaller setting it is more likely that
a strategy of cooperation will overcome the "prisoner's dilemma,"
which in this context holds that the optimal strategy for each citizen is to violate the law while all others abide by it. In a smaller
jurisdiction, there is greater likelihood of monitoring and of stigmatization or retaliation, hence greater incentive to abide by legal
9'

Storing, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 2.9.11 (cited in note 30).
9 Id. at 2.9.18. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787, 66 (1969).
98 Storing, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 2.9.18 (cited in note 30).
99 Id.

1509

Evaluating the Founders' Design

1987]

and other ethical norms. 100
2. Nature of representation. One of the principal arguments

for substantial state autonomy was that representatives in a
smaller unit of government will be closer to the people. Patrick
Henry, for example, warned in the Virginia ratifying convention
that "throwing the country into large districts . . . will destroy

that connection that ought to subsist between the electors and the
elected." 01 Assuming representative bodies of roughly the same
number, any given representative will have fewer constituents and
a smaller district at the state or local level. Each citizen's influence
on his representative, therefore, will be proportionately greater,
and geographically concentrated minorities are more likely to
achieve representation.
Because federal electoral districts must of necessity be larger
and more populous, representation is likely to be skewed in favor
of the well-known few-what were known at the time as the "aristocratic" element.102 The Federal Farmer argued that increasing
the number of representatives would make the nation "more
democratical and secure, strengthen the confidence of the people
in it, and thereby render it more nervous and energetic.'

03

How-

ever, the sheer size of the United States makes it impossible to
increase the number of representatives sufficiently, without turning
the Congress4 into what Madison called "the confusion of a
multitude.

10

Moreover, if representatives to the national government are
required to spend much of their time at the distant national capital, they are likely to lose touch with the sentiments of their constituents, and instead come to identify themselves with the interests of the central governmental apparatus. 05 Even Madison
realized that "within a small sphere, this voice [of the people]
I'0 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
101 Storing, 5 Complete Anti-Federalist at 5.16.27 (cited in note 30). The Federal
Farmer argued, similarly, that "a small representation can never be well informed as to the
circumstances of the people, the members of it must be too far removed from the people, in
general, to sympathize with them, and too few to communicate with them." Id. at 2.8.99.
102 See, e.g., Storing, 5 Complete Anti-Federalist at 5.6.2 (cited in note 30)(Patrick
Henry); id. at 2.8.158 (the "Federal Farmer"); id. at 6.12.16 (Melancton Smith).
103 Id. at 2.8.158.
,0, Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist Papers at 82 (cited in note 24).
101 Compare Storing, 2 Complete Anti-Federalist at 2.6.27 (cited in note 30)(Letters of
Cato) with Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale at 25 (cited in note 38)("the longer the
chain of officials that runs between the voter making the choice and the actual provision of
the product, the more noise is introduced into the process by the individual bureaucrats
who have their own preference functions and by the problems of information
transmission").
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could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most accurately managed."' 10 6
3. Public spiritedness. Critics of governmental centralization
warned that public spiritedness-then called "public virtue" 0 7 -- could be cultivated only in a republic of small dimensions.
Republicanism, it was thought, depended to an extraordinary degree on the willingness of each citizen to submerge his own passions and interests for the common good. 10 8 The only substitute for
public virtue was an unacceptable degree of coercion, compatible
only with nonrepublican forms of government.
There were two reasons to believe that a centralized government would undermine republican virtue. First, public spiritedness
is a product of participation in deliberation over the public good. If
the citizens are actively engaged in the public debate they will
have more of a stake in the community. The federal government is
too distant and its compass too vast to permit extensive participation by ordinary citizens in its policy formulations. By necessity,
decision making will be delegated to agents. But as they are cut off
from active participation in the commonwealth, the citizens will
become less attached to it and more inclined to attend to their
private affairs.
Second, the natural sentiment of benevolence, 109 which lies at
the heart of public spiritedness, is weaker as the distance grows
between the individual and the objects of benevolence. An individual is most likely to sacrifice his private interests for the good of
his family, and then for his neighbors and, by extension, his community. He is unlikely to place great weight upon the well-being of
strangers hundreds of miles away. It is unlikely, therefore, that citizens of a nation as large as the United States will assume an attitude of republican virtue toward national affairs.
The Founders' Design is curiously oblivious to the debate between federalists and anti-federalists over the nature of republicanism. Although much of the ratification controversy was couched
in terms of "republicanism" and "popular" government, and although this aspect of the debate powerfully supports Berger's substantive conclusions about the preservation of state autonomy, the
1 10 Papers of James Madison at 212 (cited in note 82).
See Wood, Creation of the American Republic at 68 (cited in note 97).
108 For the connection between this doctrine of public virtue and the framers' concep107

tion of religious liberty, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985
Sup.Ct.Rev. 1, 14-22; Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 22-23 (1981).
109 See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (D.D. Rapheal, ed. 1976).
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book makes no reference to it whatsoever. This is symptomatic of
Berger's anti-theoretical approach in The Founders' Design. We
would learn much more if Berger would use his considerable historiographic skills to explain the philosophic basis for the founders'
evident attachment to decentralized government.
IV.
The argument for substantial state and local autonomy was
powerful at the time of the founding, and remains so. Even though
recent Supreme Court decisions mark the all-time low in respect
for the constitutional principles of federalism, 110 there has been a
revival of interest, across the political spectrum,"' in devolution of
governing authority to state, city, and community levels. The
Founders' Design thus appears at a propitious time.
Consideration of the reasons for decentralized political decision making bolsters many of the conclusions of The Founders'
Design, though a thorough analysis of federalism today would require, as well, a more systematic appraisal of the arguments for a
centralized national authority. This I have not attempted. Moreover, if The Founders' Design is to have any practical effect, as
Berger implies is his intention (pp. 186-88), much more thinking
needs to be done about the appropriate role of the judiciary, the
Congress, and the states themselves. Berger's apparent vision that
the Supreme Court, having been informed of the founders' intentions, now has it in its power to restore the original constitutional
scheme, is fanciful, and would not necessarily be desirable even if
it were less so. The Constitution is everyone's responsibility, and
not just the Supreme Court's. Restoration of the constitutional order requires more than a history lesson directed to the Court. It
requires a renewed sense by the people of the relation of state sovereignty to the public good, individual liberty, and popular
government.
Notwithstanding its weaknesses, The Founders' Design is a
welcome addition to the bicentennial outpouring. The book pains,,o FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S.Ct. 2793 (1987).
See Mark Tushnet, Federalism and the Traditions of American Political Theory, 19
Georgia L.Rev. 981 (1985); A Symposium on Federalism, 6 Harv.J.L. & Pub.Pol. (special
issue 1982); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, - Va.L.Rev. - (1987)(forthcoming); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1059
(1980); Amar, 96 Yale L.J. 1425 (cited in note 8); Rapaczynski, 1985 Sup.Ct.Rev. 341 (cited
in note 82); Stewart, 19 Georgia L.Rev. 917 (cited in note 70); Ostrom, The Political Theory
of a Compound Republic (cited in note 31).
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takingly collects the statements of the framers and ratifiers about
each clause that contributes in a major way to the debate about
the allocation of authority between the federal government and the
states. Whatever our chosen theory of interpretation, it is good to
cast our minds back to the time of the founding, when popular
attention was directed, uniquely in our history, to the issues of
self-government. It is the only way to recall, and perhaps recapture, what we may have lost.

